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The puzzle of the brain and mind at rest – their so-called default state – is strongly influ-
enced by the historical precedents that led to its emergence as a scientific question. What
eventually became the default-mode network (DMN) was inaugurated via meta-analysis
to explain the observation that the baseline “at rest” condition was concealing a pattern
of neural activations in anterior and posterior midline brain regions that were not com-
monly seen in external-task-driven experiments. One reason why these activations have
puzzled scientists is because psychology and cognitive neuroscience have historically been
focused on paradigms built around external tasks, and so lacked the scientific and theo-
retical tools to interpret the cognitive functions of the DMN. This externally-focused bias
led to the erroneous assumption that the DMN is the primary neural system active at rest,
as well as the assumption that this network serves non-goal-directed functions. Although
cognitive neuroscience now embraces the need to decode the meaning of self-generated
neural activity, a more deliberate and comprehensive framework will be needed before the
puzzle of the wandering mind can be laid to rest.
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A SPONTANEOUS-THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Imagine a society in which people are preoccupied with shape and
color – which is to say that a person, when left to her own devices,
spends all her so-called “idle time” reflecting on all manner of
different colors and forms. Suppose that such thoughts could be
interrupted by momentary cognitive demands, such as a standard
visual paradigm or word-generation task provided by an experi-
menter. In this imaginary society, the “default mode” – meaning
the brain state during the baseline condition – would engage brain
regions involved in reflecting on shapes and colors, and would
have a well-defined neural basis because of the systematic cognitive
activity required to reflect on visual imagery.
Now consider that researchers in this imaginary society are fas-
cinated by the study of self-related thinking (core components of
proposed default-mode function in our own society) and have
developed multiple experimental designs through which to inves-
tigate it. In such a context, brain activity observed during the
so-called “baseline” state would reflect society’s collective obses-
sion with shape and color, but might seem hard to interpret for
researchers preoccupied with dissecting the various components
of self-related thinking1. Even though, outside the lab, scientists
might freely admit to spending much of their lives thinking about
chromatic and geometric variation, it might well take a surprising
length of time for even thoughtful researchers to realize that they
have relatively few psychological theories available to understand
1We are not implying that there is no overlap between brain activations associated
with self-related thinking, and those with processing shape and color.
this peculiar “baseline” state – a state during which they had
acquired a significant amount of data.
Our hypothetical example illustrates the situation facing today’s
cognitive neuroscientists as they struggle to understand what we
might call the dark side of cognition – or to use Marcus Raichle’s
formulation, the mental functions accompanying “the brain’s dark
energy”(Raichle, 2006). While neuroscientists have long embraced
the need to decode the processes and functions underlying sponta-
neous neural activity (for a comprehensive overview, see Buzsáki,
2006), cognitive neuroscience – as well as cognitive psychology,
the discipline to which it is much indebted – is hampered in this
regard by its historical legacy. Scientists are at a point at which,
to analogize through use of the hypothetical scenario above, they
are beginning to realize that their expertise in investigating and
modeling self-related thinking might not seamlessly translate into
paradigms that will allow them to grasp chromatic and geometric
variation. Moreover, as our hypothetical scenario makes clear, the
“default mode” of mental states ought not to be conceptualized
as a purely biological phenomenon. These mental states, after all,
exist within a cultural context: the operations of an unconstrained
mind will undoubtedly be shaped by the form and values of the
culture within which they unfold. In this article, we consider how
the historical context in which the default-mode network (DMN)
was documented influenced explanations of the functions that
the system played. We additionally demonstrate how the com-
plex phenomena that comprise“self-generated thought”have been
misinterpreted because of neuroscience’s failure to acknowledge
how its preoccupation with goal-focused external processing has
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skewed its assumptions about the operations of the mind during
so-called “idle” time.
It is necessary to emphasize that “self-generated thought”
is an umbrella term that incorporates – and often conflates –
several concepts at the edges of cognitive neuroscience. Task-
unrelated thoughts (Fransson, 2006), “spontaneous cognition”
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b), “mind-wandering” (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Mason et al., 2007), “free association”
(Andreasen et al., 1995; Freed, 2008), “self-focused attention”
(Gentili et al., 2009), or “introspectively oriented” thought (Frans-
son, 2005) are commonly used as synonyms for “self-generated
thought.”Such terms should not, we argue, necessarily be regarded
as equivalent; nor should it be assumed that an individual’s men-
tal processes, when she is left undisturbed, are encapsulated by
one singular construct or phenomenological experience. While
we are mindful of these complexities, we use the overarching
term “self-generated thought” throughout the current article, as
it emphasizes the opposition to “generated in response to percep-
tion” (Smallwood, in press). This conceptual contrast is important
given that perceptually guided thought has been the framework
that has been the focus of much research in cognitive psychol-
ogy and cognitive neuroscience; indeed, it is the consequences
of this dyadic framework for the current state of knowledge as
regards the mind at rest with which we are preoccupied in this
article.
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS: PSYCHOLOGY’S DEFAULT MODE
The difficulties faced by neuroscientists in their attempts to inves-
tigate self-generated cognition (which became the conceptual basis
for DMN function) have their roots in the twentieth-century
experimental techniques that were applied to understand the
mind. If one pauses and introspects upon one’s own mental life,
it becomes evident that states of self-generated mental activity
are not just common, but are central to the phenomenological
experience of being human. Although introspection reinforces
the conclusion that self-generated mental processes are impor-
tant, skepticism regarding the validity of such a technique rele-
gated investigations of self-generated cognition to the margins of
research for almost half a century.
Watson (1913) in his behaviorist manifesto argued that “intro-
spection forms no essential part of [psychology’s] methods” and
that psychology “need no longer delude itself into thinking that
it is making mental states the object of observation.” To develop
psychology as a practical science, behaviorism jettisoned the study
of consciousness as the object of study, and hence the introspective
techniques promoted by scientists such as Wundt and Titchener
(see Danziger, 1980) gave way to the use of external stimuli to
explore both human and animal behavior. In the late 1950s the
cognitive revolution resurrected the importance of internal states
in understanding human behavior, and yet psychology continued
to employ a task-based approach. Psychologists largely relied on
paradigms that used an external probe, and were more comfort-
able with interpreting objective (behavioral) responses (such as
button-presses) than subjective responses (in the form of the sub-
ject’s accounts of her experiential states in relation to the probes;
Jack and Roepstorff, 2002).
The progression of the twentieth century increased the array
of dependent measures available to psychologists, as did the cat-
egories of psychological life that were studied. While studies of
patients with specified brain lesions (e.g., Scoville and Milner,
1957) provided the foundations of a brain-based explanation
for the mind, the advent of modern neuroimaging techniques
(e.g., PET and fMRI) enabled researchers to measure brain activ-
ity during covert mental processes while participants performed
psychological tasks. The 1980s witnessed creative collaborations
between neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists, whose ability
to dissect human behavior using experimental task-based designs
provided a basis for cognitive neuroscience.
At this point, the discipline was a neural extension of the
reaction-time model (which the nineteenth-century physiologist,
Donders, 1969, had used), in which a mental process is isolated by
subtracting a control state from a task state (Raichle, 1998). Brain
activity cannot be measured in absolute terms and so to localize
brain areas that are more active during a specific task, a neutral, so-
called “baseline” brain state is needed from which increases can be
identified. Task-based neuroimaging studies tended to use a resting
baseline (often a fixation cross), which was assumed to be a neutral
comparison to task-induced brain activity. However, researchers
began to notice that sometimes during this control condition a
constellation of regions, often on the medial surface of both hemi-
spheres, exhibited heightened activation relative to external tasks
(Buckner, 2012). These serendipitous findings emerged in the con-
text of a paradigm that was not expecting them – and that did
not initially have the conceptual tools with which adequately to
interpret them (see Callard and Margulies, 2011 for an histori-
cal analysis of the complex emergence of the new scientific object
that would become the “DMN”). In 2001, Marcus Raichle and
colleagues published three papers (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001;
Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001) that described the base-
line resting state as the “default mode” of function, and argued
that because the observed decreases in brain activity appeared to
be “largely task independent,” there might “be an organized mode
of brain function”that is present as a baseline or default state and is
suspended during specific goal-directed behaviors (Gusnard et al.,
2001, p. 4259). Two years later, Greicius et al. (2003) coined the
functional-anatomical term “DMN,” arguing that it “account[ed],
in large part, for the phenomenon of task-related decreases in
brain activity.” Here, it is important to bear in mind that the DMN
refers to a specific set of neural regions, whereas the default mode
is used to describe the state underlying self-generated cognitions
that emerge when individuals are left idle. Although the network
has become the manifest functional correlate of the default mode,
these two basic concepts should not be equated on a one-to-one
basis.
THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT ON
CONCEPTIONS OF THE DEFAULT-MODE NETWORK
There are at least two ways in which early formulations of the
DMN were hampered by the historical context in which they
emerged. First, because neuroscience had an almost exclusive focus
on external-task-based experiments during the 1990s, the major-
ity of studies included in the first meta-analysis (Shulman et al.,
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1997) showing “task-induced deactivations” required the continu-
ous focus of attention and motor responses, as well as a capacity to
concentrate for reasonable durations. As the DMN was defined by
neural regions that were not involved in the experiments included
in the meta-analysis, its uniqueness during the resting state was
at least in part a historical quirk of the experiments conducted
over the prior decade: if research had been dominated by experi-
ments probing different psychological constructs, our capacity to
interpret the activity of the DMN – as well as what was in fact
delineated as the DMN – would likely have been different. Indeed,
it is important to emphasize that the degree to which the DMN –
and, indeed, other networks, appear to be “activated” during “at
rest” states will inevitably depend on the nature of the experi-
mental task condition to which the resting state is compared.
(If, for example, the task condition centrally engages autobio-
graphical memory and prospective thinking, then there may well
appear to be very little activation of the DMN during the “at rest”
periods.)
It is now evident that the DMN should not be conflated with
the activity of the mind in toto at resting state. Smith et al. (2009)
found that the same networks activated by tasks (as derived from
a meta-analysis) were also correlated in activity during the rest-
ing state. These findings demonstrate that the DMN is in no
way commensurate with spontaneous neural activity, as it is now
clear that the whole brain exhibits functionally organized behavior
when not occupied by an external task. This suggests that spon-
taneous neural activity should not be seen as a hallmark of the
DMN, and so raises deep questions about how to determine which
elements of spontaneous neural activity relate to which forms
of conscious, self-generated thought. The relationship between
“functional correlations” and “functional activity,” as well as the
relationship between both of these phenomena and conscious
thought are undoubtedly conceptually complex, as well as very
difficult to investigate experimentally using fMRI2. The extent to
which cognitive neuroscience as a whole has grasped the scale of
these experimental as well as conceptual challenges is far from
clear.
Neuroscientists have faced obstacles in their efforts to identify
and disentangle these elements in part because the historical bias
toward explicating external processing has meant that the psy-
chological vocabulary for describing internally generated mental
content is relatively stunted. But it should be emphasized that
from the late nineteenth century onward, both psychology and
related disciplines (e.g., psychiatry and psychoanalysis) show evi-
dence of fascinating, though largely marginalized investigations
into states of mind that depart from the well-studied construct
of externally focused attention. James (1890), in his Principles of
Psychology, for example, reflected on that “curious state of inhibi-
tion” that tends to be produced by “[f]atigue” and “monotonous
mechanical occupations that end by being automatically carried
on.” Indeed, James’s definition of attention explicitly encompasses
both internal and external trains of thought – an aspect of atten-
tion that was largely neglected for many decades. Moreover, there is
a compelling body of literature – largely unknown or disregarded
2We thank one of the reviewers for this important point.
in cognitive psychology – that documents various methods to
investigate the processes characterizing activities pursued during
so-called “idle time” (e.g., Green, 1923; Singer, 1966; Antrobus,
1968). These include introspective methods, the free association
methods of psychoanalysis, visualization, and guided imagery
methods. Some use (boring) external stimulation tasks precisely
to provoke unconstrained mental activity, while others attempt to
capture such activity more directly. This literature demonstrates a
complicated lineage of overlapping terms for what we now refer
to as self-generated mental activity – including daydreaming, fan-
tasy, mind-wandering, and dissociation. It is not difficult to see
that if these research domains had flourished within cognitive psy-
chology rather than been neglected, our vocabulary for describing
self-generated thought would have been richer; our methods to
investigate such thought more creative; and hence our capacities
to interpret the psychological meaning of different forms of spon-
taneous neural activity in different systems, including the mental
life and associated neural systems of the DMN, more substantial.
The second way that historical pressures influenced interpre-
tations of DMN functions also arose from the observation that
such systems exhibited activity in conditions under which the
neural systems engaged in task-based experiments were absent.
Researchers concluded from these observations that the psycho-
logical processes that these regions serve are non-goal directed:
Raichle and colleagues’ initial papers on the default function, for
example, assumed that “spontaneous . . . mental activity” (which
was described as stimulus-independent thoughts, daydreams, task-
unrelated imagery, free association, or stream of consciousness)
occurred when “subjects are not actively engaged in goal-directed
behavior” (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). This line of argumen-
tation resulted in the network itself being described in 2005 as
task-negative (Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2006). Further cement-
ing this view that the networks served dichotomous functions
was the observation that a network of dorsolateral prefrontal and
superior parietal brain regions were found to be “anti-correlated”
with activity within the DMN at rest (Fox et al., 2005). This
counterbalanced interaction between such large-scale networks
was considered by several publications to have cognitive signifi-
cance (Hampson et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2008), and to be a core
aspect of functional brain organization. As such, this apparent
“see-sawing” of neural activity between two widespread brain net-
works suggested rather intuitive – and folk-psychological – distinc-
tions between opposing psychological functions of goal-oriented
cognition and spontaneous thought. Thus the second way that
the historical context influenced our notions of the DMN arose
from cognitive science’s conflation of goal-directed thought with
external processing.
Recent evidence has begun to challenge the core assumption of
the task-negative view of DMN function by demonstrating that the
internally generated thought that this system supports can have
a goal-driven component. For example, when task demands are
minimal, self-generated thought occurs most frequently in those
individuals who perform well on goal-driven tasks (Levinson et al.,
2012); while self-generated thought can be associated with a reduc-
tion in the processing of distracter stimuli, a hallmark process
by which individuals stay on task to achieve goals (Barron et al.,
2011). Finally, self-generated thought is generally focused on the
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future (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a; D’Argembeau et al., 2010;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011), suggesting the experience serves the func-
tion of autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood
and O’Connor, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011). Similarly, evidence
from cognitive neuroscience demonstrated that periods of self-
generated thought can engage both elements of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the DMN (Christoff et al., 2009), and under
these circumstances connectivity between these regions is higher
than when on task (Christoff, 2012). In addition, the experience
of mind-wandering and the process of autobiographical planning
entail activity in both the DMN and the executive system (Spreng
et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2011).
Self-generated thought and the DMN can, therefore, per-
form goal-directed functions, and when doing so engage broadly
similar domain general cognitive and neural processes as when
external-goal-related tasks are performed. The initial formulation
of the DMN as a task-negative network engaged in “idle” mental
processes was in part a legacy of the historical tendency to study
hidden mental processes through the lens of external, perceptually
driven tasks. Critically, self-generated activity arises from memory
(rather than perception), and thus external tasks can provide only
limited insight into the psychological features of these forms of
cognition.
A good example of how understanding self-generated thought
through the lens of an external task can lead to erroneous
conclusions can be seen in studies linking the experience to
error. Research in the first decade of the twenty-first century on
daydreaming and mind-wandering has demonstrated that self-
generated material (gathered through self-report methods) could
be associated with worse external attention (for a review see Small-
wood and Schooler, 2006). In neuroscience, the activity of the
DMN demonstrated a similar property: its activity was heightened
in the period prior to poor external task performance (Weissman
et al., 2006). At a general level, the observation that self-generated
thought is a barrier to external processing is hardly surprising: per-
haps the most well documented fact about brain function is that it
cannot perform an infinitely large number of tasks simultaneously.
Nonetheless, these observations served two critical functions. First,
they clarified that self-generated material had an observable con-
sequence on data that could be verified at the third-person level,
a necessary requirement for its scientific analysis. Second, they
helped to provide a working hypothesis regarding what should be
explained: these studies could show that the experience of self-
generated thought is intermittent and so entails (i) a process by
which attention ebbs and flows between an internal and external
focus and (ii) a system with a limited capacity that cannot attend
to everything at the same time.
These data were, however, often used to make an additional
inference: that the occurrence of self-generated states during task
performance indicated an absent-minded or unintended lapse in
the capacity to focus attention on the task (McVay and Kane, 2010).
While it is undoubtedly correct that difficulties in control can lead
to problems focusing on external information, this does not mean
that all examples of self-generated thought result from failures to
control attention, even if they are detrimental to a task. As indi-
viduals can choose to engage in self-generated thought, the only
conclusion that can be drawn from studies linking self-generated
thought, or DMN activity, to poor external attention is that the
architecture of the brain means that external and internal processes
are in competition for limited resources (Smallwood, 2010). Again,
we see how the strong disciplinary preoccupation with externally
directed attention influenced the assumptions used to interpret
the characteristics of self-generated thought.
MOVING BEYOND DEFAULT POSITIONS
We have demonstrated that disciplinary legacies and preoccu-
pations have shaped neuroscientists’ conceptions of the default
mode, the DMN, and self-generated thought in non-trivial ways.
In order to move beyond the default positions that have tended
to be advanced in relation to these phenomena, it is important
that neuroscientists and their cognitive psychology collaborators
first of all acknowledge some of the significant limitations of
these default positions. Such acknowledgment would, in turn,
open the possibility of more extensive engagement with margin-
alized literature (from the past – and increasingly the present)
that offers conceptual and methodological creativity in explor-
ing these phenomena. The growing fascination with resting-state
functional connectivity fMRI within cognitive neuroscience will
not, in and of itself, necessarily result in the field becoming bet-
ter at exploring and understanding the contents of consciousness
that individuals self-generate when at rest. To make progress
on this front, it will be necessary to integrate characterizations
of phenomenological experiences with measurement approaches
that extend beyond contrast-based methodologies of traditional
fMRI.
In addition, it is worth reflecting with some seriousness on
the implications of the thought experiment with which we intro-
duced our article. Studies have documented that the DMN is
engaged in self-referential autobiographical thought (Mitchell
et al., 2006), but the extent to which the DMN supports a rela-
tively domain general psychological process, rather than reflects
a system that is tied to a specific form of content, is far from
clear. Just as the preoccupations of a scientific community can
fluctuate over time, the social and experimental context in which
the research subject is embedded will surely influence the uncon-
strained thoughts that she engages in when given the opportunity
to do so. Consider a comparison of the default modes of scien-
tists who are preoccupied with shapes, color and other forms of
visual imagery with those who excel at playing chess or at attun-
ing themselves to their own and others’ emotions. Would these
individuals’ minds be similar or different when at rest? While the
content of unconstrained thought is likely to be affected by the
values of the society and/or communities to which those individ-
uals belong, the general lack of interest from neuroscientists in
earlier research that has attempted to explore such questions (e.g.,
studies in Singer, 1966) means that we are far from being able
adequately to answer this question. It is time to recognize that the
intricacies of self-generated thought cannot be understood sim-
ply by the application of standard neural cognitive approaches:
to move beyond the default positions that neuroscience adopts
when studying self-generated thought, it will be necessary to
adopt specific theories and methods that are tailored to under-
standing the different qualities of experiences that fall within this
category.
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